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Abstract 
 Front-line police operations are deeply entwined with less visible 
activities – or practices not commonly identified as policing – that are carried 
out by a wide range of participants as strategies of settler-colonial pacification 
operating through the organizing logics of security and liberal legalism. Using 
open source texts and records obtained through access to information 
requests, this article unmaps some of the contemporary strategies employed by 
Canadian institutions to pacify Indigenous resistance. As a contribution to the 
body of work seeking to develop the politics of anti-security, the analysis 
disrupts the binary categories that animate security logic by examining the 
public order policing approach of the Ontario Provincial Police, the framing of 
Indigenous resistance as a security threat, and the integral role of Indian Affairs 
in securing the settler-state.2 
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 Since December 2012, Indigenous peoples and their non-indigenous supporters 
have engaged in a wide range of direct actions such as round dance flash mobs, blockades 
of rail-lines, highways and bridges, hunger strikes and demonstrations. These actions, 
affiliated with the Idle No More movement and reflecting varying degrees of militancy, 
have been on-going throughout what is now known as Canada, and solidarity actions 
have occurred around the world. Thus far Canadian police forces largely appear to be 
following a public order policing approach emphasizing flexibility and communication 
with protesters. Under this model, police discretionary power is exercised to allow 
protests to occur while maintaining the safety and “security” of all involved by 
minimizing physical violence. This approach is often described as “soft” policing in 
                                                 
1  Tia Dafnos is a PhD candidate in Sociology at York University. Her dissertation research engages in an 
(un)mapping of the police-security apparatus involved in responding to Indigenous peoples’ protests in 
Canada. She can be contacted at tdafnos@yorku.ca. 
2 My thanks to the two anonymous reviewers, Elaine Coburn, Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos for 
their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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contradistinction to “hard” policing characterized by immediate enforcement through 
coercive force. Yet as Neocleous and Rigakos (2011) argue, this distinction between “soft” 
and “hard” policing is one of the false binaries at the root of security logics that 
(re)produce, in this case, the Canadian settler state. Front-line police operations are 
deeply entwined with less visible activities – or practices not commonly identified as 
policing – that are carried out by a wide range of participants as strategies of settler-
colonial pacification operating through the organizing logic of security and liberal 
legalism. 
 My approach in this paper is to turn the research gaze onto state institutions and 
dominant discourses to unmap colonial strategies (Razack 2002) deployed by the state 
and settlers in pacifying Indigenous resistance. As a settler, I realize that the role of non-
Indigenous scholars as ‘experts’ presents risks of drowning out Indigenous voices as 
experts on their own experiences, both of colonialism and of resistance. I have attempted 
to address this by focusing my analysis on settler colonial strategies more than speaking 
or commenting on Indigenous resistance. 
 Drawing on open source texts and on records obtained through access to 
information requests, my focus is on public order policing, “securitization” and the 
framing of Indigenous resistance as national security threats to the state and private 
sector interests, and the policing role of Indian Affairs in securing the settler-state. My 
analysis seeks to disrupt some of the binary categories that animate the entwined logics of 
security and liberal legalism that legitimize these practices. The organizing of the world 
into dichotomous categories, as Monture-Angus (1999, 42) notes, is “a colonial 
manifestation.”  Neocleous and Rigakos (2011) argue that disrupting security logic is 
crucial to counter its de-historicizing and de-politicizing effects. As settlers and as 
academics, this is a refusal to be complicit in the exercise of colonial power by inhabiting 
and legitimizing its categories.  
 
Policing, Security and Liberal Legalism 
 
 Drawing on the work of Foucault (2007), Neocleous (2000) and Rigakos et al. 
(2009), policing is understood as the production or “fabrication” of social order that is 
amenable to processes of capitalist accumulation. Police power is exercised through a 
range of techniques and institutions. The police – as a specific institution – is a significant 
state agent of policing, distinguished by its capacity to use “legitimate” violence to 
produce this social order. Security is a mode of policing that is historically-specific to the 
development of capitalism, and organizes society through the politics of liberalism and its 
technologies of individualism and responsibilization. Liberty, defined in large part by 
individual accumulation, consumption and possession, is secured through policing; 
conversely, policing is legitimized by the necessity or demand for liberty (Neocleous 
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2008). As Neocleous (2011) argues, this organizing logic of security-liberty should be 
understood as pacification – the production of social relations and institutions in place of 
existing forms of social organization. More specifically, it is the fabrication of a “new” 
society through the destruction of an existing one.  
 Pacification has an historical-materialist basis in imperialism and colonialism 
whereby imperial powers attempt to transform societies in ways that facilitate the 
territorial expansion necessary to the accumulation of capital (see Alfred 2005; Neocleous 
2010, 2011). In the context of settler colonialism, pacification attempts to eradicate 
existing Indigenous societies while establishing a new society on expropriated land that 
also erases its colonial past (see Wolfe 2006; Veracini 2010). As Wolfe (2006) emphasizes, 
settler colonialism is not about replacing, or substituting, a society but the construction of 
a new one. Pacification thus involves both destructive and productive policing practices, 
which encompass a wide range of strategies deploying sovereign (repressive), disciplinary 
and governmental modalities of power simultaneously. The specific permutation of these 
modalities is dynamic and dependent on context; however, overtly coercive strategies – 
while always present – tend to take a backseat to political and ideological techniques of 
pacification, specifically those of liberalism. As Manuel and Posluns (1974) argue, “the 
common good” is an important discursive device in legitimating and securing colonial 
social order (see also Alfred and Corntassel 2005). 
 The legal apparatus is therefore a central means of pacification (Neocleous 2010, 
2011). Yet it is the omnipresence of state violence that enables disciplinary and 
governmental techniques (see Alfred 2005). This is evident in the specific legal strategies 
deployed in fabricating settler colonial order such as the expropriation of land and 
resources, the displacement and confinement of Indigenous peoples, the criminalization 
of means of subsistence outside of waged labour, and assimilationist mechanisms such as 
residential schools and the outlawing of cultural practices. These strategies work to 
disrupt and destroy Indigenous identities and social, political and economic relations 
while establishing an order facilitating capitalist accumulation (Monture-Angus 1999; 
Alfred 2005; Alfred and Corntassel 2005; Coulthard 2007). At the same time, these 
policing techniques are continuous with those that fabricate class structure through the 
protection of private property, the ordering of spaces, moral regulation and the 
criminalization of alternatives to the wage labour market. 
 There is a dialectical relationship between pacification and resistance, as other 
contributions in this issue also show, and this relationship sustains a permanent social 
insecurity inherent to capitalism and the settler state. Thus, pacification is on-going and 
constantly shifting, shaped by forms of resistance and broader historical-spatial dynamics 
(see Alfred and Corntassel 2005). Settler colonialism must be understood as a continuing 
process of constituting society rather than as a temporally-bounded “event” of the past 
that the “new” society has moved beyond (Wolfe 2006). Anti-colonial and class struggles 
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are enduring features of settler colonial states and as Simpson (2008, 13) states, 
“Indigenous Peoples whose lands are occupied by the Canadian state are currently 
engaged in the longest running resistance movement in Canadian history,” predating the 
state itself.  Pacification projects are on-going “wars” against resistance in the fabrication 
of order (Rigakos 2011). Using settler-colonial pacification as a conceptual framework, I 
examine some key facets of the contemporary policing of Indigenous resistance in 
Canada, which operate with/in security-liberal logic; these policing practices should be 
understood as continuities of settler-colonialism shaping colonial and class relations. This 
requires sketching out the interconnectedness of state institutions, which are woven 
together by the logic of security-liberalism to operate as means of settler colonial 
pacification vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples and nations.  
Comaroff and Comaroff (2007, 144) describe the use of law as a means of 
“political coercion, even erasure” in the colonial context as lawfare. This conception 
captures the simultaneously destructive and constitutive power of law in settler-
colonialism. The contemporary Canadian legal apparatus is organized in and through the 
framework of liberal legalism, which is symbolized by the constitutional enshrining of 
individual rights. Canada’s inclusion of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in its 1982 
constitution marks its status as a liberal democratic nation-state within the global order, 
engaged in practices favourable to investment and accumulation (see Goodale 2005). 
Drawing on the arguments of Brown (1995) and Ford (2002), liberal legalistic “rights” 
establish norms for behaviour that produce “good” liberal subjects by shaping conduct to 
be consistent with security logic. In critiquing the politics of recognition, Coulthard 
(2007) argues that the dominant liberal rights-based discourse, in which these politics are 
based, constitutes Indigenous peoples as “subjects of empire.”  This regime of legal 
liberalism is a central mechanism through which threats to settler state sovereignty and 
capitalist accumulation are managed.  
Thus, within a “liberal democratic” society, “legitimate” means of engaging in 
political contention include the electoral process, judicial mechanisms to enforce the rule 
of law and uphold rights, and participating in acts of political dissent in public spaces. 
The latter instance brings participants into contact with the police institution. Here lies 
the paradox for Indigenous struggles. The liberal democratic political, legal, judicial, and 
police institutions are the colonial institutions of the settler state whose legitimacy is 
being challenged and whose existence is predicated on the elimination of Indigenous 
societies.  Indigenous scholars such as Monture-Angus (1999), Henderson (2002), Alfred 
(2005), Coulthard (2007), and Corntassel (2008), have emphasized that the arena of 
liberal rights-based discourse works to limit self-determination in ways that reproduce 
and reinforce these colonial institutions.   
Reflecting the dialectical nature of resistance and pacification, it could be said that 
gains (although not without significant limitations) have been made in the arena of 
lawfare, such as the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights and the 
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resolution of some land claims. For example, the removal of Indian Act prohibitions on 
political activities in the 1960s facilitated mobilizations relating to the Canadian 
constitution. In turn, the formal protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 
has provided a basis for legal challenges to violations and encroachments. Similarly, the 
lifting of restrictions on use of government money to research land claims is crucial for 
being able to bring these claims forward. However, these legal processes are always 
limited by their contradictions or “logical consistencies” (Alfred and Corntassel 2005, 
612). The specific claims process established in 1973 is a prime example of this 
contradiction as the state – through Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) – plays 
a dual role as both negotiator for and defendant against Indigenous challenges.3 Between 
1970 and 2006, only 275 specific claims had been completed of the 1337 filed. With an 
average of 20 years to settle a claim, communities and land are vulnerable to further 
encroachments as the claim moves through the process (Gordon 2010; Pasternak, Collis 
and Dafnos 2013).  
Moreover, the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights has been 
compromised through law itself. Although the 1997 Delgamuukw decision affirmed that 
section 35 protected Aboriginal title the court ruled that the guarantee of exclusive use 
and occupation of land could be infringed by the Crown based on “valid” objectives. As 
Henderson (2002, 37) states, “[b]y their interpretations of the constitutional order and of 
our treaty order, the courts created the colonial structure of federal Indian law.” 
Aboriginal and treaty rights have been further targeted through the comprehensive 
claims process, a form of “modern treaty-making”, which is based on extinguishing 
Aboriginal title (see Monture-Angus 1999; Henderson 2002; Alfred 2005; Coulthard 
2007; Gordon 2010). As Coulthard (2007) argues, rights are “recognized” by the state 
(and settlers) as long as they do not disrupt political-economic relations.  Most recently, 
these constitutional protections have been further eroded through the Conservative 
government’s unilateral adoption of omnibus Bill C-45, which included legislative 
amendments impacting Indigenous self-determination (see Diabo 2012). Diabo (2012) 
describes these as part of a “termination plan” enacted by the Harper government, which 
follows a legacy of political-legal attempts to destroy Indigenous communities through 
assimilation.  
In the context of these colonial political and legal mechanisms, direct action such as 
blockades and reclamations are often options of last resort, particularly when 
communities are faced with the imminent loss or desecration of land and rights (Alfred 
2005; Borrows 2006; Maaka and Fleras 2005). Such actions are spaces of direct interaction 
with the police institution, which has been central to the displacement, dispossession and 
repression of Indigenous peoples in the colonial project (Samuelson and Monture 2008; 
                                                 
3 In June 2011, INAC changed its name to Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. As most 
of my sources precede the name change, and for the sake of continuity, I use INAC throughout this paper. 
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Gordon 2006, 2010). The liberal legalism of lawfare further extends to this arena of 
resistance in the state’s management of protests and the legitimization of coercive 
policing that bears a closer resemblance to warfare.  
 
Pacification Through Protest Policing 
 
 In the context of the emergence of liberal legalism in the late twentieth century, 
Canadian police forces began instituting formal policies and guidelines reflecting the 
adoption of a “measured response” or negotiation-based approach to public order 
policing. Following trends in most Anglo-American and western European nation-states, 
this “new” policing model emphasizes communication and negotiation with protesters, 
with the purported aim of averting an escalation of physical violence. Explicitly working 
through liberal legalistic discourse, the aim of this “new” policing is to balance the rights 
of protesters with ensuring public safety (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998; 
McPhail and McCarthy 2005). The exercise of dissent in this context is shaped by the 
responsibilization of subjects to police themselves and others according to the bounds of 
“acceptable” (that is, legal) behaviour as agreed upon in negotiation with the police.  
 This “new” approach is often juxtaposed – by police as well as in academic 
literature – to an “escalated force” approach characterized by coercive policing and 
disregard for civil rights. In Canada, the “shift” in public order policing has been 
particularly associated with the policing of Indigenous peoples’ protests, blockades and 
reclamations. This “shift” has therefore been framed by police forces as consistent with, 
or emblematic of, a more “progressive” policing that is conscious and respectful of rights 
and of the unique context of the protests. The juxtaposing of these two official policing 
models positions current practices as desirable according to liberal democratic ideals; the 
effect, however, is to mask the enduring coercive power underlying these techniques.  
 Paralleling the imbalance of “negotiation” found in the land claims process, police 
forces play a dual role in “facilitating” protests while serving as agents of the state with a 
primary concern to keep the “peace” of settler-colonial order. The notion of a 
“negotiation” is grounded in the liberal legalistic conception of contractual agreement 
between autonomous parties, with the inference that the participants have an equal 
amount of influence and power in shaping the outcome. However, the police institution, 
being invested with the state’s monopoly of use of violence, maintains significant leverage 
in “negotiations” around the conditions and parameters of protest; the spectre of coercive 
force is ever-present, whether overt or not. The “flexibility” of this policing approach is an 
enhancement of discretionary power in the application and enforcement of law.  
 The exercise of police discretion is informed by, and shapes, distinctions between 
“good” and “bad” protesters (Waddington 1998; King and Waddington 2006), which 
reproduces a binary of the good liberal subject and the “uncivilized” Other – a 
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fundamental feature of imperialism and colonial control (see LaRocque 2010). Those who 
do not actively cooperate with police direction, and who engage in disruptive direct 
actions, would fall into the latter category. The justification for use of overtly coercive or 
“hard” policing tactics is legitimized by the unreasonableness and irresponsibility of 
individuals who do not exercise their rights “properly” through “neutral” and “objective” 
(that is, liberal) legal and political processes or institutionalized forms of protest. 
Racialization and racist discourse furthers the othering of Indigenous peoples engaged in 
disruptive direct actions as the “uncivilized” Other – the “internal dangerous foreigner” 
in the settler colonial state (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009). The logic of security-
liberalism neutralizes the threat of resistance by attempting to institutionalize it within 
“legitimate” liberal democratic channels while also providing legitimization for the state’s 
use of overt and covert repression to manage potential threats to “public safety” – i.e. 
security – posed by those who have not been or cannot be pacified as good liberal subjects 
– or “subjects of empire” (Coulthard 2007).  
 It is significant therefore that implementation of “negotiation”-based policing 
policies has occurred along with the enhancement of coercive capacities, evident in the 
normalized use of paramilitary tactical units (such as Emergency Response Teams or 
tactical teams), joint-training between law enforcement agencies and armed forces units, 
the proliferation of “less-than-lethal” weaponry, the adoption of command and control 
structures, as well as the prioritization of intelligence-led policing practices and 
surveillance. To distinguish these capacities – and their augmentation – as somehow 
discrete from the adoption of measured response/negotiation based policing is to 
reproduce a liberal and artificial distinction. Rather than oppositional or contradictory, 
these strategies reflect an intensification of the politics and techniques of security and 
liberal legalism. 
 To illustrate the institutionalization of these policing strategies, the Ontario 
Provincial Police (OPP) serves as a clear example. The shooting of Anthony “Dudley” 
George by the OPP during the 1995 Ipperwash reclamation was a significant catalyst in 
the formalization of a negotiation-based public order policing approach by the 
organization. The OPP’s reforms in this respect were built upon three pillars: a plan for 
developing better relationships between the force and Indigenous communities, the 
introduction of Aboriginal Relations Teams and Aboriginal liaison officers, and the 
development of guidelines in a “Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal 
Critical Incidents.”4 The guiding principles of these reforms are to build trust that would, 
in turn, enhance communication and improve the prospects for avoiding violent 
confrontation. Underlying these principles is an assumption that lack of direct 
communication – hindering police knowledge of potential protests and negotiation over 
                                                 
4 In 2009, the OPP’s Aboriginal Relations Teams and Major Events Liaison Teams were rebranded with a 
common name as Provincial Liaison Teams. 
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their parameters – increases risk and thus the potential for violence. At the same time, the 
OPP formally adopted an intelligence-led policing framework, as well as made changes to 
public order policing such as by adopting a command and control structure and 
equipping Emergency Response Team members with less-than-lethal weapons – use of 
which would previously have required deployment of the Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU) 
(OPP 2006a). Together these reforms emphasized improved decision-making based on 
the assumption that having more and better tactical intelligence would serve a 
preventative function and avert recourse to physical force, but also would contribute to 
developing future-oriented strategic intelligence. 
The operationalization of these policing practices begins with the definition of 
“critical incident” itself, which implies a situation that is out of the ordinary, or, an 
exception to “normal” circumstances. According to the “Framework” (OPP 2006b, 2), a 
critical incident is 
  
An incident where the source of conflict may stem from assertions 
associated with Aboriginal or treaty rights, e.g. colour of right, a 
demonstration in support of a land claim, a blockade of a transportation 
route, an occupation of local government buildings, municipal premises, 
provincial/federal premises or First Nations buildings.  
 
There is an expanded definition in the OPP’s “Aboriginal Initiatives: Building Respectful 
Relationships” (2006c, 49):  
 
All incidents assessed to be high-risk on a First Nations’ territory or 
involving an Aboriginal person, and where the potential for violence 
requires the activation of the  OPP Integrated Response (Level 2 Incident 
Commander, ERT, TRU and Crisis Negotiators); or any incident where 
the source of conflict may  stem from assertions associated with 
Aboriginal, inherent or treaty rights. 
 
Through the two-part definition, the implication is that any incident involving an 
Indigenous person or relating to treaty or Aboriginal rights is considered “high-risk”, 
which comes with the deployment of the highly coercive integrated response.5 As noted 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that it was a member of the Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU) that fatally shot Dudley 
George. According to the OPP’s guidelines, the TRU is activated as part of the integrated response after a 
decision by the Incident Commander confirming the incident as “high risk” (OPP. 2006. OPP Emergency 
Response Services: A Comparison of 1995 to 2006. Accessed March 11, 2008. 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries 
/ipperwash/policy_part/projects/pdf/Tab4_OPPEmergencyResponseServicesAComparisonof1995to2006.p
df) 
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by Commissioner Linden (2007) in his final report of the Ipperwash Inquiry, despite the 
vast majority of protests by Indigenous peoples having been characterized by little to no 
violence, there is a persistent perception and representation of such events as risky and 
threatening based on a perceived potential for violence. The “risk” posed by Indigenous 
resistance to the settler state provides the rationale for surveillance – and the production 
of intelligence – on Indigenous communities as a normalized colonial practice.  
 
Securing the Infrastructure of Settler-Colonialism: Surveillance and Security 
 
 These official shifts in police forces’ policy must be more broadly contextualized 
as an aspect of what Neocleous (2008) describes as an intensification of securitization 
since September 11, 2001, which challenges the perception that this is a novel or 
substantially different project from what was happening before. The intensification and 
expansion of the state security apparatus is directly linked to capital’s expansionist logic. 
This is evident in the case of Indigenous struggles, which have long been cast as 
“problems” of “national security” because of the nature of the conflict. Self-determination 
struggles that hinge on the importance of land threaten settler state sovereignty.6 In 2007, 
INAC noted – in a presentation to the RCMP – that the “vast majority of Hot Spots are 
related to lands and resources” and that “most are incited by development activities on 
traditional territories”.7 
With the on-going expansionist impulses of capitalism, the Canadian state has 
amplified its role in facilitating further “development” of land and resource extraction to 
maintain “competitiveness” in the global economy, imminently threatening Indigenous 
communities’ land and self-determination. In this context, reclamations and blockades of 
“development” projects have been characterized as threats to (national) security because 
of their potential disruption of the critical infrastructure of the state, defined in both 
physical and economic terms. In its National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, Public 
Safety Canada (PSC) defines “critical infrastructure” as “processes, systems, facilities, 
technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or 
economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government” (Public 
Safety Canada 2009, 2). Critical infrastructure is further categorized into ten sectors: 
energy & utilities, finance, food, transportation, government, information & 
communication technology, health, water, safety (emergency preparedness) and 
manufacturing. Because critical infrastructure is defined as essential to the functioning of 
the state, its actual or potential disruption is defined as a national security threat. This 
                                                 
6 On distinctions between self-determination and sovereignty, see e.g. Monture-Angus 1999; Alfred 2005; 
Corntassel 2008. 
7 INAC. 2007. Aboriginal Hot Spots and Public Safety [Presentation slides]. March 30. Obtained through 
ATI request to RCMP, no. GA-3951-3-00060/11. 
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national security framing therefore legitimizes surveillance and other forms of 
intelligence-gathering as “preventative” and pre-emptive measures. In the current context 
of the dialectical intensification of conflict between capital’s expansionist push and 
Indigenous resistance (see Alfred 2005; Gordon 2010), there has been an augmentation of 
intelligence networks, which include private sector “stakeholders” and government 
departments such as Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 
The importance of critical infrastructure to national security, and its implications 
for Indigenous resistance, is reflected by organizational changes to both the RCMP and 
CSIS. The establishment of the National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) Branch 
in the RCMP reflects the “securitization” of the police institution after September 11, 
2001 to more prominently include national security within its jurisdiction. According to 
an NSCI orientation guide, the branch is “alone in attempting to prevent and/or 
investigate incidents where the state itself (and not necessarily any citizen in particular) is 
the direct target” (27).8 This includes “terrorist activities” as defined by the Anti-
Terrorism Act, and offences “arising out of a threat to the security of Canada” as defined 
by the CSIS Act (32). Within the NSCI, the Critical Infrastructure Criminal Intelligence 
(CICI) section currently focuses on the energy and utilities, transportation, and finance 
sectors, as well as cyber-security threats as they impact on these three sectors. Members of 
the CICI section actively cultivate relationships with private owners and operators in each 
of these sectors to encourage the exchange of information.  
According to a 2007 RCMP briefing note, 85 percent of Canada’s critical 
infrastructure is under private ownership and operation.9 It is not surprising therefore 
that the CICI section relies heavily on partnerships with third parties who are both 
“clients” (recipients of intelligence) and sources of information and intelligence. As part 
of the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, CSIS, RCMP and Natural Resources 
Canada (NRCan) have jointly hosted bi-annual meetings since 2005 during which energy 
companies are briefed on classified intelligence. The purpose of these meetings, according 
to NRCan, is to assist owners and operators “to plan and develop measures to protect 
their facilities.” Yet, the subject matter of these briefings has included topics such as 
cyber-security, intellectual property rights and the 2010 Toronto G20 Summit. According 
to NRCan, the breadth of this subject matter is part of the “all-hazards” emergency 
management approach guiding the Strategy (Groves 2012). This reflects an increasingly 
formalized symbiosis between corporate entities and the Canadian state in the security 
project. 
                                                 
8 RCMP. 2008. NSCI Orientation Guide. (Obtained by Tim Groves, Toronto Media Co-op, through ATI 
request to RCMP and released online). Accessed January 24, 2013. http://toronto.mediacoop.ca/blog/tim-
groves/14272.  
9 RCMP. 2007. Briefing note to Deputy Commissioner. June 4. Obtained through ATI request to RCMP, no. 
GA-3951-3-00060/11. 
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 Since 2004, the production of intelligence relating to national security threats has 
been centralized by the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) – renamed in June 
2011 as the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre – which was established as part of 
Canada’s National Security Policy. ITAC produces intelligence and threat assessments 
that are used to inform the coordinated response to national security threats by the 
Government of Canada. These products are developed through the exchange of 
intelligence with law enforcement and intelligence partners in Canada as well as a wide 
range of government departments and external domestic and international sources 
including counterparts in the US, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. ITAC’s intelligence 
products are also disseminated to other levels of government, international partners and 
the private sector. While ITAC is a component of CSIS, it is staffed by representatives 
from its domestic partner agencies including the RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency, 
National Defence, and Transport Canada. Personnel from departments such as Health 
Canada, Environment Canada, and NRCan may be brought in when needed (ITAC 
2012). INAC may also be seconded to ITAC, as was the case with the 2007 National Day 
of Action. In 2007, the Assembly of First Nations adopted a resolution calling for a 
National Day of Action on June 29 to raise awareness about issues affecting Indigenous 
communities. Although promoted as a “peaceful” event, several communities organized 
actions considered “militant”. In preparations for the day, representatives from INAC 
were placed in ITAC to facilitate the exchange of information and to “enhance [its] 
analytic capacity” in producing threat assessments on “aboriginal protests”.10  
 Historically, the contribution of INAC to the integrated production of national 
security intelligence stems from the department’s colonial knowledge base of the social, 
political and economic dynamics, geographies and legal situations of the Indigenous 
communities under its administration. In 2006, INAC and Public Safety Canada (which 
includes RCMP and CSIS) developed an operational plan on “aboriginal occupations and 
protests” aimed at enhancing collaboration, communication and information-sharing 
between the two entities.11 The exchange of intelligence information among INAC and 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies is a long-standing practice that can be traced 
back to the relationship between Indian Affairs and the North West Mounted Police in 
the 19th century (see Smith 2009). Surveillance, as Smith (2009) argues, was the main 
                                                 
10 PSC. 2007. Federal Coordination Framework for AFN National Day of Action June 29 2007. May 8. 
Obtained through ATI request to PSC, no. 1336-A-2009-0052. In these ITAC threat assessments, the 
supremacy of securing “critical infrastructure” is clear: “the right of Canadians to engage in peaceful protest 
is a cornerstone of Canada’s democratic society. ITAC is concerned only where there is a threat of 
politically-motivated violence, or where protests threaten the functioning of critical infrastructure” 
(Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). 2007. Threat Assessment: Aboriginal Protests Summer 2007. 
May 11. Obtained through ATI request to CSIS, no. 117-2008-123).     
11 INAC. 2007. Aboriginal Hot Spots and Public Safety [Presentation slides]. March 30. Obtained through 
ATI request to RCMP, no. GA-3951-3-00060/11. 
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modality of colonial power in this period, backed by the omnipresent threat of coercive 
police or military intervention. Since the early 2000s, INAC has been enhancing and 
systematizing its own internal production of intelligence. While these contemporary 
practices adopt new means, formats and configurations, they are continuous with Indian 
Affairs’ historical surveillance practices as a key mechanism of settler-colonial 
pacification.  
As part of the Canadian government’s implementation of the Emergency 
Preparedness Act in 1988, INAC established an Emergency Management Assistance 
Program (EMAP). Initially, the EMAP was limited to coordinating assistance for fire 
suppression services and search and recovery operations for reserve communities. The 
scope of “emergencies” was expanded in 2004 to include a wider range of activities 
relating to health and safety, as well as infrastructure and housing. In 2007, the federal 
government introduced the Emergency Management Act, which set out four pillars of 
emergency management reflecting a preventive “all-hazards” approach: mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery.  
Significantly, the Act also broadened the definition of emergency to include “civil 
disobedience”.12 A 2007 INAC review of its EMAP recommended the establishment of a 
dedicated section to administer the program and the inclusion of “civil disobedience” 
within its formal mandate.13 These recommendations were implemented in 2008 as INAC 
established the Emergency and Issues Management Directorate (EIMD) to manage the 
EMAP in line with the four pillars. “Civil unrest” was gradually incorporated into the 
formal purview of the EIMD as a form of “human induced emergency”—a category that 
also includes “terrorist acts”. According to a 2010 evaluation of the EMAP, the rationale 
for monitoring civil unrest in Indigenous communities stems from the fact that “the 
outcomes of these events have a direct impact on First Nations and, by extension, on the 
Department”. This includes civil unrest that occurs off of reserves, which is outside 
INAC’s authority (INAC 2010, 18, 32). All potential and occurring “unrest” and events 
“are closely monitored and, in cases of escalation, INAC’s regional offices  are in a 
position to provide assistance to first responders in order to better understand issues that 
may have triggered  these protests and to  mitigate risks to individuals and property” 
(INAC 2010, 39). Of course, in the case of protests, “first responders” would be the police 
forces of jurisdiction. 
INAC’s surveillance – or to use its own terminology, “monitoring” – of 
Indigenous communities is coordinated by the national headquarters’ Emergency 
                                                 
12 Under the Emergency Management Act, all federal departments are expected to implement measures 
consistent with this all-hazards framework.  
13 Holman, Brad. 2007. Final Report: Formative Evaluation – Indian and Northern Affairs Emergency 
Management Assistance Program. July 31. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Obtained through 
ATI request to INAC, no. A-2011-01156. 
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Management Operations Centre (EMOC).  On-the-ground monitoring and operations 
are carried out by each of INAC’s ten Regional Emergency Management Operations 
Centres,14 which report events and activities occurring within the region to the national 
EMOC. The regional offices are responsible for developing and maintaining direct 
relationships with reserve communities, and a range of other “partners” including 
provincial and territorial emergency management offices, non-governmental 
organizations, private sector representatives, Indigenous peoples’ organizations and 
municipal governments (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2011). 
Monitoring is not limited to INAC’s own activities but draws on information from the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Northern Resources Canada, federal negotiation 
teams, media and police intelligence.15 Both the regional and national EMOCs produce a 
variety of “situational awareness products” that are shared with INAC senior 
management, intelligence agencies, law enforcement and other first responders (such as 
fire services), and other agencies on a continuous basis. The products include situation 
reports and notifications about specific events, which are produced and disseminated as 
events or “issues” emerge. Based on an analysis of these records obtained through access 
to information requests, it is common for two or three notifications to be issued for a 
single event. Weekly summary reports are produced that provide a roundup of issues 
coming onto the EIMD’s radar for that week. Weekend summary reports are notices of 
events to watch for, providing contact information for an on-duty EIMD officer to report 
to. The reporting system had been referred to informally as the “hot spots reporting 
system”, particularly in reference to protest “hot spots”. Based on an analysis of 
summaries produced between 2007 and 2011 by HQ and Ontario Region, the most 
common types of issues appearing in these summaries are forest fires, flooding and “civil 
unrest”.16 Since 2009 the EIMD appears to be devoting more resources to monitoring and 
analysis of “civil unrest” with an interest in identifying trends. This is reflected in the 
production of incident reports beginning in 2009-10. According to the 2009-10 report, 
109 of 217 reported “incidents” were protests; in 2010-11, 91 of 251 incidents were 
protests.17  
It is of significance to note that the Emergency Management Act giving rise to the 
EIMD and its focus on “civil unrest” received assent on June 22, 2007 – seven days before 
the planned National Day of Action. On March 30, INAC representatives made a 
                                                 
14 Each province and territory has its own regional office except for the Atlantic provinces, which are served 
by one Atlantic regional office.  
15 INAC. 2007. Aboriginal Hot Spots and Public Safety [Presentation slides]. March 30. Obtained through 
ATI request to RCMP, no. GA-3951-3-00060/11. 
16 These reports were obtained through ATI requests A-2010-00831, A-2010-02632, A-2011-02004, A-2011-
2003, A-2011-01157, A-2012-0033, and A-2012-0032. 
17 INAC. 2010. Incident Report 2009-2010: Emergency and Issue Management at INAC. August. Obtained 
through ATI request to INAC, no. A-2012-00257. 
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presentation to the RCMP, highlighting its “hot spot reporting system” as a key source of 
information about protest risks. According to the presentation there is a “synergy” 
between INAC’s system and those of CSIS, ITAC, RCMP and the Government 
Operations Centre.18 In 2009, INAC developed a Police Interchange Program through 
which a police officer is seconded to the EIMD office to provide advice and support from 
a law enforcement perspective. The program is intended to enhance collaboration 
between INAC and Canadian law enforcement organizations. This interfacing of INAC 
operations and police-security institutions is directly connected with the state’s 
prioritization of securing territory and resources – “critical infrastructure” – as issues of 
national security (see Diabo and Pasternak 2011). 
 INAC’s “monitoring” of protests is intertwined with its responsibility for claims 
and negotiations relating to Indigenous land and treaty rights. The conflict of interest in 
INAC’s double-role as both negotiator and defendant to Indigenous challenges is 
compounded by its direct participation in the policing of protests that often arise out of 
frustrations with the political-legal processes of the state and with INAC itself. In the 
context of the 2007 NDA, INAC’s involvement was not limited to contributing 
information to the intelligence gathering of law enforcement and intelligence partners; 
the department’s bureaucratic and political power – deriving from its administration of 
land claims, policy and funding arrangements – was also deployed as a key strategy in the 
state’s pacification efforts. 
 Paralleling the negotiation-based approach to public order policing discussed 
above, INAC representatives (including the minister of Indian Affairs) played a direct 
role in “negotiations” with First Nations leaders aimed at preventing potentially 
disruptive direct actions. Email exchanges within PSC and the Department of National 
Defence (DND) discuss INAC’s active role in attempting to convince leaders to “stand 
down their plans” for the NDA.19 A priority in the state’s overall policing strategy was to 
contain “hot spots”. One “hot spot” of particular concern to INAC, police and intelligence 
organizations was the on-going reclamation by the Haudenosaunee of Six Nations of 
Grand River. In February of 2006, members of the community “occupied” land near 
Caledonia, Ontario, which halted construction of the Douglas Creek Estates housing 
development by Henco Industries. A pre-dawn raid on the site by the Ontario Provincial 
Police on April 20 had escalated tensions and fuelled several disruptive solidarity 
actions.20 The situation at Caledonia was identified by PSC, RCMP, CSIS, and INAC as a 
                                                 
18 The Government Operations Centre is PSC’s emergency operations centre into which all other 
departmental emergency management systems are connected. 
19 DND, email, May 31 2007. Obtained through informal ATI request to DND, no. A-2007-00590. 
20 For more on the reclamation, see Laura DeVries. 2012. Conflict in Caledonia: Aboriginal Land Rights and 
the Rule of Law. Vancouver: UBC Press. For an analysis of the policing operation, see Tia Dafnos. 2012. 
Beyond the Blue Line: Researching the policing of aboriginal activism using access to information, in 
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“militant” one that had the potential to further galvanize other Indigenous communities; 
as such, there was concern to avoid overt confrontation.21 The Six Nations of Grand River 
have a number of outstanding land claims with INAC, including the one encompassing 
the reclaimed land that was trickling through the system as Henco began construction. 
One month before the National Day of Action, a secret DND email revealed that INAC 
had “made a significant offer related to Caledonia and plans to make some broader policy 
announcements in the coming weeks as preventative measures. Everything will be timed 
carefully”.22 In its contribution to the coordinated government strategy in policing the 
NDA, INAC offered a $125 million settlement in four of the other Haudenosaunee 
claims, contingent on ending the reclamation and providing assurances that future 
reclamations would not occur (Daly 2007). The offer was rejected and the reclamation 
continues today while the land claim remains in the institutional system.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 These fragments or snapshots of contemporary pacification in Canada show how 
the ideological binaries of liberal-legalism and security logic fall apart when we adopt an 
anti-security approach that understands policing as pacification. By focusing specifically 
on the pacification of Indigenous self-determination, we can see how a wide range of 
policing practices work in and through each other – continuous and simultaneously – to 
contain resistance while securing intertwined interests of settler state sovereignty and 
capitalist accumulation. The fluidity and inter-connectedness of these strategies defy 
categorization as being either/or soft-hard, low-high, or public-private. Re-appropriation 
of the term pacification is, as Neocleous (2011) argues, a political move, and one that is 
imperative in countering the denial or erasure of the reality of settler-colonialism in 
dominant discourses. The association of pacification with inter-nation warfare, applied as 
a lens through which to understand policing practices and institutions of the Canadian 
state, keeps the colonial and imperial dynamics of the state at the fore. This is perhaps 
especially vital as the acceleration of neoliberalism continues to intensify struggles. 
Instead of a decline of state violence as implied by liberal legalism, Gordon (2010) argues 
that there has been an increase of coercion directed at Indigenous resistance, enacted 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brokering Access: Power, Politics and Freedom of Information Processes in Canada, edited by Mike Larsen 
and Kevin Walby. 209-233. Vancouver: UBC Press.   
21 PSC. 2007. Federal Coordination Framework for AFN National Day of Action June 29 2007. May 8. 
Obtained through ATI request to PSC, no. 1336-A-2009-0052. 
22 DND, email, May 31 2007. Obtained through informal ATI request to DND, no. A-2007-00590. The 
reference to policy changes likely refers to proposals for a Specific Claims Tribunal, and the eventual release 
of an action plan Specific Claims: Justice at Last, which outlined four pillars of impartiality, transparency, 
faster processing of claims and improved access to mediation. These measures received assent in 2008 (see 
Pasternak, Collis and Dafnos, 2013).  
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through both lawfare and more direct coercive, intrusive policing. This intensification of 
pacification also extends to poor and working class people, who are disproportionately 
people of colour, women and migrants, targeted by increasingly punitive social policies 
and the expanding prison-industrial complex.  
The emergence of the Idle No More movement, and associated actions, at the end 
of 2012 that has continued into 2013 reflects a culmination of frustration, distinguished 
by its duration, diversity of tactics, and geographical scope. The movement has included a 
significant number of disruptions of railways, highways and border crossings. While 
front-line police forces have been most visible in responding to protest activities, the 
national security, political, legal and administrative apparatuses are very much active in 
this exercise—in partnership with the private sector. The potential scale of coordinated 
resistance by Indigenous peoples and the escalation of direct actions disrupting critical 
infrastructure, pose a significant threat to Canada’s political economy, which creates the 
conditions for further exposing the settler-colonial politics of security-liberal ideology 
through the state’s response.  
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